HomeFrontPageProf. Abavare backs independent anti-corruption commission, calls for abolition of death penalty

Prof. Abavare backs independent anti-corruption commission, calls for abolition of death penalty

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The Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) has proposed far-reaching reforms to Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, including making selected socio-economic rights enforceable in court, abolishing the death penalty and establishing an independent Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission.

The proposals also seek to strengthen digital privacy protections, reform the determination of public-sector salaries and allowances, and introduce an independent regulatory framework for political parties and campaign financing.

President of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) chapter of the University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG), Professor Eric K. K. Abavare, has endorsed several of the recommendations, describing them as important steps towards strengthening human rights, accountability and institutional independence.

Professor Abavare outlined his position in the eighth instalment of a nine-part commentary on the CRC’s report, titled “Human Rights, Corruption and the Independent Bodies.”

In the analysis, he argues that the proposed reforms could address longstanding governance challenges and improve citizens’ ability to hold public institutions accountable.

However, he cautions that their effectiveness would depend largely on the constitutional safeguards, financial independence and enforcement powers provided to the institutions expected to implement them.

One of the major recommendations highlighted by Professor Abavare is the proposal to elevate selected socio-economic rights under Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution into enforceable fundamental human rights under Chapter Five.

Currently, Chapter Five guarantees civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, protection against unlawful detention and freedom from discrimination, which citizens can enforce through the courts.

By contrast, several socio-economic provisions, including access to food, healthcare and housing, are contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy and are generally treated as constitutional objectives guiding government policy rather than directly enforceable individual rights.

The CRC is proposing a more targeted approach that would make selected aspects of these rights justiciable under clearly defined circumstances.

Under the proposals, the right to food would be enforceable for persons in state custody, while the right to healthcare would receive legal protection in genuine emergencies. The right to housing would also become enforceable in cases involving forced eviction.

Professor Abavare supports the proposed approach, arguing that it strikes a balance between expanding constitutional protection and avoiding an unreasonable burden on the courts.

He maintains that making every socio-economic aspiration immediately enforceable could create practical difficulties, particularly in developing countries where governments operate under significant resource constraints.

He therefore considers the identification of specific circumstances in which citizens can seek judicial intervention a reasonable starting point.

To illustrate the practical implications, he refers to detainees who may spend nights in police cells without adequate food and residents facing forced evictions or demolitions in communities such as Old Fadama.

He argues that the proposed amendments would give constitutional meaning to these protections by providing affected individuals with a legal basis to challenge certain state actions or omissions.

Professor Abavare has also thrown his support behind the CRC’s recommendation to abolish capital punishment in Ghana.

He observes that although the death penalty remains part of the country’s legal framework, Ghana has not carried out an execution since 1993.

In his assessment, the prolonged absence of executions reflects a longstanding position against capital punishment, but the country has yet to complete the constitutional and legislative processes required to formally abolish it.

The Committee is proposing amendments to Articles 3, 13, 19, 72 and 94 of the Constitution to remove references to the death penalty.

Professor Abavare argues that constitutional abolition would provide a more permanent safeguard than relying on the position or policy preferences of successive governments.

He identifies the possibility of wrongful convictions as one of the strongest arguments against capital punishment, stressing that an execution cannot be reversed even if subsequent evidence establishes that the person convicted was innocent.

He believes life imprisonment without parole, following due process, could serve as the maximum punishment for the gravest offences.

Although acknowledging that the proposal could generate public debate and disagreement, he urges Ghanaians to support the abolition of the death penalty and ensure that the decision is constitutionally entrenched.

The proposed modernisation of Article 18, which provides constitutional protection for privacy, is another area examined in Professor Abavare’s commentary.

He argues that the existing constitutional framework must evolve to address technological developments that have significantly transformed how personal information is collected, stored and used.

He points to the widespread use of biometric identification systems, electronic financial transactions, mobile money services, SIM registration and CCTV surveillance as developments that have created new privacy concerns.

The increasing use of the Ghana Card, which contains biometric information, also highlights the importance of protecting sensitive personal data from unauthorised access, misuse and disclosure.

The CRC is proposing to extend constitutional privacy protections expressly to biometric, electronic and informational data.

Professor Abavare considers the proposed amendments necessary to protect individuals against potential abuses by government institutions and private organisations that collect and process personal information.

However, he stresses that constitutional amendments alone would not be sufficient to address the emerging challenges.

He calls for carefully designed supporting legislation to establish clear rules governing the collection, storage, processing, sharing and protection of personal information.

A particularly significant institutional reform examined in the commentary is the proposed establishment of an independent Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission (AEC).

Under the CRC’s proposal, the Attorney-General would no longer exercise prosecutorial authority over corruption cases, with that responsibility transferred to the proposed commission, which would have its own prosecutors.

The Committee also proposes restricting the Attorney-General’s power to discontinue criminal proceedings through a nolle prosequi without obtaining leave of the court.

Professor Abavare believes the proposed changes could address longstanding concerns about political influence over corruption investigations and prosecutions.

He argues that changes in government have often generated public questions about the consistency of corruption-related investigations, particularly where cases involving officials of previous administrations appear to lose momentum following political transitions.

In his view, transferring responsibility for prosecuting corruption cases to an independent constitutional institution could help reduce perceptions that such proceedings are influenced by the political interests of the government in power.

However, he cautions that establishing another anti-corruption institution would not automatically guarantee improved accountability.

He questions how the proposed AEC would differ from the existing Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), particularly regarding its operational independence, financial resources and capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile corruption cases.

Professor Abavare warns that without strong constitutional protections, the proposed commission could become another institution with limited resources and insufficient authority to deliver meaningful results.

To prevent this, he recommends that the commission’s financial independence be constitutionally guaranteed through a funding arrangement that limits undue Executive influence over its operations.

He also calls for strong security-of-tenure provisions for commissioners, suggesting that their tenure protections should be comparable to those enjoyed by Justices of the Superior Courts.

He argues that these safeguards would enable the commission to investigate and prosecute corruption cases without fear of political retaliation or interference.

Professor Abavare has also welcomed the CRC’s proposal to establish an Independent Public Emoluments Commission (IPEC) to replace the existing ad hoc arrangements for determining the emoluments of Article 71 officeholders.

The proposed commission would serve as a permanent constitutional institution responsible for determining public-sector remuneration, including salaries and benefits for the President, Members of Parliament, Justices of the Supreme Court, teachers, police officers and other public-sector employees.

A major component of the proposed reform is the replacement of the controversial quadrennial ex-gratia payments to Members of Parliament with a structured pension arrangement.

Ex-gratia payments to political officeholders have repeatedly attracted public criticism, with sections of the population questioning the justification for the amounts paid at the end of parliamentary terms.

Professor Abavare believes the proposed commission could help address public dissatisfaction by introducing a more transparent and independent mechanism for determining salaries, allowances and other benefits across the public sector.

He describes the recommendation as one of the most important aspects of the CRC’s report, arguing that an independent remuneration-setting institution could reduce public resentment and improve confidence in the management of public-sector compensation.

Nevertheless, he raises concerns about whether political leaders would genuinely be prepared to surrender their influence over decisions concerning their own remuneration.

He questions whether the proposed commission would be allowed to operate without interference, particularly given the potential conflict of interest arising when the Executive and Legislature have a stake in remuneration decisions.

He further cautions that constitutional provisions alone may not eliminate the perceived relationship of mutual political interest between the two arms of government.

For the proposed institution to achieve its objectives, he argues, its independence must be protected both in law and in practice, with sufficient safeguards against political manipulation or deliberate delays in implementation.

Another major recommendation examined by Professor Abavare is the establishment of an Independent Registrar and Regulator of Political Parties and Campaigns (IRRPC).

The proposed institution would take responsibility for regulating political parties and overseeing campaign financing, allowing the Electoral Commission (EC) to concentrate more fully on its core electoral responsibilities.

Its mandate would include monitoring campaign expenditure, regulating political donations and enforcing disclosure requirements to improve transparency in political financing.

The CRC has also proposed campaign expenditure limits covering a 120-day period, alongside mandatory disclosure of campaign donors.

Professor Abavare believes the reforms could help address concerns about the influence of undisclosed financial contributions and illicit money in Ghanaian politics.

He points to the use of vehicles, food items, campaign materials and other incentives during election campaigns as examples of the challenges confronting efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in political financing.

However, he argues that the proposed institution’s effectiveness would depend on whether it is given sufficient enforcement powers to ensure compliance.

He recommends that the IRRPC should have the authority to disqualify candidates who violate campaign financing regulations, subject to judicial review.

He also proposes that appeals against its decisions should be determined by the Court of Appeal rather than being subjected to executive control.

According to him, without meaningful sanctions and effective enforcement mechanisms, the proposed regulatory institution risks becoming another body whose rules exist largely on paper.

In his overall assessment, Professor Abavare describes the human rights and independent institutions component of the CRC’s report as the moral centre of the proposed constitutional reforms.

He argues that the recommendations could significantly strengthen the relationship between citizens and the State by expanding enforceable rights, improving protection against abuses of power and creating institutions capable of promoting greater accountability.

He particularly highlights the proposed enforceable rights to food, healthcare and housing in defined circumstances, the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, stronger digital privacy protections and the transfer of corruption prosecutions to an independent commission.

He also identifies the proposed Independent Public Emoluments Commission and the Independent Registrar and Regulator of Political Parties and Campaigns as potentially important mechanisms for addressing longstanding concerns about public-sector remuneration and political financing.

Despite his broad support for the proposals, Professor Abavare insists that their implementation must be accompanied by strong constitutional safeguards to protect the independence and effectiveness of the proposed institutions.

He warns that without guaranteed funding, security of tenure, clearly defined mandates and effective enforcement powers, the new bodies could struggle to achieve the objectives for which they are being established.

He therefore urges Ghanaians to support the proposed reforms while paying close attention to the safeguards needed to prevent future governments from weakening, manipulating or undermining the institutions.

The eighth instalment forms part of Professor Abavare’s nine-part analysis of the Constitutional Review Committee’s report.

The final instalment is expected to examine the safeguards and constitutional provisions that would determine how easily future governments could reverse, amend or undermine the proposed reforms.

By 1960news.com

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